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We used unpublished reports, published manuscripts, and communication with investigators to identify
and summarize 49 anthrax-related epidemiologic field investigations conducted by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention from 1950 to August 2001. Of 41 investigations in which Bacillus anthracis
caused human or animal disease, 24 were in agricultural settings, 11 in textile mills, and 6 in other settings.
Among the other investigations, two focused on building decontamination, one was a response to bioter-
rorism threats, and five involved other causes. Knowledge gained in these investigations helped guide the
public health response to the October 2001 intentional release of B. anthracis, especially by addressing
the management of anthrax threats, prevention of occupational anthrax, use of antibiotic prophylaxis in
exposed persons, use of vaccination, spread of B. anthracis spores in aerosols, clinical diagnostic and lab-
oratory confirmation methods, techniques for environmental sampling of exposed surfaces, and methods
for decontaminating buildings.
he intentional release of Bacillus anthracis in October
2001 greatly challenged the U.S. public health system.
Collaborating with partners in other federal, state, and local
health agencies, the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) responded to these bioterrorism events by relying
on experience investigating public health aspects of anthrax
over the past 50 years (1). Topics addressed in these investiga-
tions included epidemiology, vaccines (2,3), controlling
anthrax in industrial and agricultural settings (4), public health
response to bioterrorism events (5), B. anthracis contamina-
tion of milk and meat (6), identifying B. anthracis–contami-
nated commercial products (7), decontamination methods for
contaminated environmental sites, and laboratory methods,
among others.
Field studies conducted by the Epidemic Intelligence Ser-
vice (EIS) constituted the cornerstone of these investigative
efforts (8). When invited by a state health department or
national ministry of health, CDC’s EIS Officers conduct field
investigations, Epidemic-Aids (known as Epi-Aids), in
response to acute public health needs in the United States and
other countries. Recently, historic documents from >4,000
Epi-Aids (approximately 90% domestic, 10% international)
from 1950 to 1999 were made more accessible through the
creation of an internal, searchable electronic database. It
includes many unpublished CDC reports on early anthrax
investigations, which form the basis of this report. 
B. anthracis, the gram-positive, spore-forming, rod-shaped
bacterium that causes anthrax (9), is most commonly a
zoonotic pathogen. Human B. anthracis infections are rare in
the United States; the number of cases has decreased steadily
from an average of 35 reported cases per year in the 1950s to
<1 reported case per year since 1980 (10,11) (Table 1). Most
reported cases have been cutaneous. Before October 2001, the
last case of inhalational anthrax in the United States occurred
in 1976 (12,13).
To answer questions raised when the bioterrorism-related
cases of anthrax were identified in October 2001, we reviewed
results of field investigations of anthrax. We also identified
current questions for which past experience with anthrax pro-
vided relatively little information and for which further
research is needed.
Methods
CDC anthrax-related field investigations from 1950 to
2001 were identified from several sources. First, the new data-
base of historical Epi-Aid documents (1950–1999) was
searched to retrieve all documents in which “anthrax” or
“anthracis” appeared either as an assigned keyword or as a text
string in a full-text search. Epi-Aid documents related to
anthrax investigations in 2000 and 2001 were identified manu-
ally in an EIS administrative database. These searches identi-
fied a variety of types of documents, including initial requests
for epidemiologic assistance, interim progress reports, final
reports, and memoranda.
To identify published reports on these Epi-Aid investiga-
tions, we searched indexes to the Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (MMWR) for anthrax-related reports for the
years 1961–2001. The individual issues of MMWR and its
predecessor (Weekly Morbidity Report) were searched manu-
ally for the years (1950–1960) for which no index exists. To
identify published reports on anthrax-related Epi-Aid investi-
gations, we searched Medline for the years 1966–2001 and
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Index Medicus for 1950–1965. The names of the lead investi-
gators from the Epi-Aids were used as keywords.
Additional CDC anthrax-related field investigations were
identified by two coauthors (PB and AK) who were personally
involved in most anthrax investigations conducted by the
agency since the 1950s. References describing these additional
investigations were located in the MMWR and in published
medical articles. To limit this report to a description of CDC’s
institutional experience, rather than a broader review of publi-
cations on anthrax investigations, we excluded (a) anthrax case
reports published in the MMWR but unrelated to a CDC field
investigation and (b) published reports on anthrax by investi-
gators not affiliated with CDC.
From the unpublished Epi-Aid documents and published
reports for each investigation, we abstracted the following
information: year, location, number of human and animal
cases, clinical form of the disease, occupational or other expo-
sures for human patients, environmental sampling methods
and data, and study recommendations. 
Results
A total of 49 relevant field investigations (Table 2) were
included in this report: 42 Epi-Aids and 7 other investigations.
Detailed reports and MMWR published summaries were avail-
able for 39 (93%) of the 42 Epi-Aid field investigations. For
three agriculture-related investigations (Epi-Aids 1963-2,
1959-38, 1957-17), only the initial invitation for epidemio-
logic assistance was available for review. 
Of these 49 field investigations, 41 (84%) involved human
or animal infections with B. anthracis, 2 were evaluations of
decontamination of B. anthracis–contaminated textile mills
(1967 and 1972), and 1 was an investigation of bioterrorism
threats involving anthrax (1998). In the other 5 investigations,
B. anthracis was not found to be the causative organism,
despite initial suspicion. Because these investigations include
only anthrax cases for which CDC’s assistance was requested,
they represent only a small proportion of the total number of
U.S. cases reported during this period (Table 1).
Most of the investigations (41/49, 84%) were conducted
from 1950 to 1980; only 8 anthrax-related investigations were
conducted by CDC from 1980 until the October 2001 bioterror-
ism events. This trend mirrors the decline in reported U.S.
anthrax cases in the latter half of the 20th century (10) (Table 1). 
Site
Among the 41 field investigations involving infection with
B. anthracis (Table 2), 24 involved an agricultural setting
(farms, contact with livestock, or both), 11 textile mills, 4 B.
anthracis–contaminated commercial products, and 1 contami-
nated cow bones; in 1 instance, the source of infection was not
determined. Thirty-eight (93%) of the 41 investigations took
place in the United States; other investigations were conducted
in Haiti (1974), Paraguay (1986), and Kazakhstan (1998).
Clinical Form and Mechanism of Infection
All U.S. investigations involved cutaneous or inhalational
anthrax (Table 3). Excluding large outbreaks in Kazakhstan
and Paraguay, investigations in this report include 39 cutane-
ous and 9 inhalational cases of human anthrax. Among the
investigations with available information on age and sex of
Table 1. CDC field investigations of suspected anthrax in humans and animals, and reported cases of anthrax in humans, United States, 1950–2001a
Years
Field investigations
No. of cases of anthrax in 
humans reported nationallyc No. of investigationsb
No. of human cases
Cutaneous Inhalational Total
1950–54 2 1 0 1 223
1955–59 11 16 6 22 131
1960–64 4 5 1 6 54
1965–69 7 5 1 6 21
1970–74 8 4 0 4 13
1975–79 6 5 1 6 10
1980–84 0 0 0 0 2
1985–89 1 1 0 1 3
1990–94 1 0 0 0 1
1995–99 2 0 0 0 0
2000–01d 2 2 0 2 Not available
Total 44 39 9 48 458
aCDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
bExcludes three investigations of suspected anthrax conducted outside the United States (1967, 1986, 1998) and two investigations focused on decontamination of Bacillus anthracis–
contaminated textile mills (1967, 1972).
cSources: CDC. MMWR Summary of Notifiable Diseases, United States, 1994 (10); and MMWR Summary of Notifiable Diseases, United States, 1999 (11).
 dBefore October 2001 bioterrorism-related anthrax cases.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1165
ANTHRAX PERSPECTIVES
patients, ages ranged from 19 to 67 years (median 40 years),
and most cases were in males (Table 3).
Routes of infection were largely a function of setting. Of
the 27 cases in textile mills, 21 (78%) were cutaneous, and 6
(22%) were inhalational. Contaminated goat hair or wool was
the primary vehicle of infection. Persons working with raw,
unprocessed materials were at greatest risk for infection (4).
Of the six inhalational cases in textile mills, five were fatal.
Three cases of fatal inhalational anthrax were also reported in
non-textile mill workers (12,31) (Epi-Aid 1967-43). 
Of the 24 investigations in agricultural settings, 9 (38%)
included at least one human case. All human cases were
acquired cutaneously while a person was handling, performing
necropsy on, or disposing of dead animals. The most extensive
cross-infection between animals and humans occurred in the
1998 outbreak in Kazakhstan, in which at least 53 human
cases occurred; most were cutaneous cases acquired from
slaughtering animals (Epi-Aid 1998-83).
Although four investigation reports included concern over
possible waterborne transmission ([15] and Epi-Aids 1966-12,
1975-6, 1979-95), this route was not identified in any of the
reports of human cases, and water contamination was not
regarded as a source of infection. However, disease incidence
in animals usually coincided with extremes of wet and dry
weather conditions.
Gastrointestinal anthrax was documented in one investiga-
tion. Of the 53 persons with anthrax in the 1998 Kazakhstan
outbreak, 2 were diagnosed with gastrointestinal anthrax after
eating contaminated raw meat. In 1968 in Connecticut, 204 kg
of  B. anthracis–contaminated meat was sold as hamburger
before the epizootic investigation; although purchasers of the
meat could not be located, no human cases of anthrax were
known to have occurred from the contaminated meat (Epi-Aid
1968-78). In addition, in 2000, a Minnesota farm family ate
well-cooked meat from a B. anthracis–infected steer. Some
family members had gastrointestinal symptoms, but investiga-
tors could not confirm or rule out infection with B. anthracis
(54).
Human Prophylaxis
In nine outbreaks, 136 persons were documented to have
received antibiotic postexposure prophylaxis. In at least five of
the investigations, postexposure prophylactic therapy was
stopped once additional information about risk became avail-
able. None of these reports described subsequent infections in
patients who received any prophylaxis. Early prophylactic reg-
imens used penicillin injections, which were later replaced by
tetracycline, then doxycycline and quinolones, administered
orally or parenterally (Epi-Aids 1966-18, 1999-25). Prophy-
lactic antibiotics have been recommended in specific cases
involving direct physical contact with contaminated material,
but are not routinely recommended because the risk for an
adverse drug reaction may exceed the risk for infection (Epi-
Aid 1975-6). In one report describing a series of events not
consistent with public health recommendations, a worker who
was potentially exposed to B. anthracis in a rendering plant
placed a large bottle of tetracycline on a lunchroom table, and
coworkers took various amounts of antibiotics if concerned
about potential exposure (Epi-Aid 1979-95).
In a 1962 field investigation, an acellular anthrax vaccine
was demonstrated to be 93% effective in reducing the risk for
infection with B. anthracis in humans. The vaccine was subse-
quently recommended for persons who handle imported hair,
wool, hides, or bone meal (2).
Occupational Exposures
In 23 of the 27 U.S. investigations involving human
anthrax, exposures occurred in occupational settings. The
other four investigations involved exposure to contaminated
commercial products or to aerosolized B. anthracis spores
while a person was passing close to contaminated industrial
mills. Among persons exposed in textile mills, most affected
workers had direct contact with wool and goat hair as part of
their job. However, in 1961, fatal inhalational anthrax
occurred in a secretary at a goat hair–processing mill (Epi-Aid
1961-40), and in 1966, cutaneous anthrax occurred in a truck
driver who helped unload baled goat hair at a mill (Epi-Aid
1967-43).
In agricultural settings, most cases were in ranchers or
other workers who were exposed during the slaughter, butch-
ering, or disposal of B. anthracis–infected animals. During
1957–1971, cutaneous anthrax occurred in six veterinarians
after they performed necropsies on infected animals; one vet-
erinarian had not used gloves during the necropsy, another had
an anthrax lesion on his wrist (suggesting it was uncovered),
and no information is available about glove use by the other
veterinarians. Other occupational exposures include the goat
hair exposures of a pipe insulator in Ohio (51,52) and a weaver
in California (12).
Environmental and Clinical Testing
Specific environmental sampling methods were described in
26 (59%) of the 44 investigations. Sampling methods varied by
setting. In textile mills, investigators usually tested samples
from raw and processed materials, especially goat hair and
wool. In nine investigations, air and surface samples were also
tested from numerous locations in and around the mills. In 1978
in North Carolina (Epi-Aid 1978-47), 300 soil samples were
taken from the mill premises, the landfill, and private residences
near the mill; none tested positive for B. anthracis. Samples
were also tested from floor sweepings and vacuum cleaner con-
tents from inside the homes of four mill workers; one sample
tested positive for B. anthracis. In 1953 in North Carolina (Epi-
Aid 1953-14), two guinea pigs and four mice were exposed to
the air near operating machines in the mill for 3½ hours; no test
results are available. No reports of the subsequent investigations
of textile mills mentioned the use of such animal tests for envi-
ronmental sampling during an acute epidemic, although pri-
mates were experimentally exposed to air from a B. anthracis–
contaminated textile mill in South Carolina (55).ANTHRAX PERSPECTIVES
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Table 2. Characteristics of CDC field investigations of anthrax in humans and animals, 1950–August 2001a
Year Location
No. of cases
Reference Comments Human Animal
Agricultural settings (n=24 investigations)
2001 TX (southwest) 1 1,638  Epi-Aid 2001-61 Large  epizootic affecting 63 properties in five counties;
members of at least 11 animal species were infected with
Bacillus anthracis.
2000 ND (east) 1 Multiple Epi-Aid 2000-69, (14) USDA recommended quarantine on affected premises, vac-
cinating livestock on surrounding premises, and burning
and/or burying infected carcasses, bedding, and other nearby
materials.
1998 Kazakhstan At least 53 Multiple Epi-Aid 1998-83 Multivariate analysis found highest risk for cutaneous
anthrax from slaughtering, butchering, and cutting B.
anthracis–infected animals; eating cooked infected meat not
an important risk factor.
1998 Uvalde, TX One vac-
cine expo-
sure
0 Epi-Aid 1998-55 Patient accidentally exposed to attenuated live anthrax vac-
cine while vaccinating horse, experienced severe myalgia
and fatigue, then began antibiotic prophylaxis and recovered.
Laboratory tests negative for B. anthracis.
1993 ND (southeast) 0 8 (15) NIOSH and USDA investigation following major flooding,
anthrax in livestock, and soil contamination. Concern over
contaminated water supply, but all water samples negative.
1986 Paraguay At least 21 0 Epi-Aid 1986-39, (16) Community outbreak of cutaneous anthrax in a remote vil-
lage.
1979 Clay County, IA 0 16  Epi-Aid 1979-95 Raising chlorine level to 2 ppm eliminated two positive sam-
ples in well water. In local hospital records, no difference in
number of gastrointestinal symptoms compared with same
month in previous year.
1976 Foard and Cottle 
Counties, TX
0>  160  Epi-Aid 1976-115, (17) Significantly  higher attack rates in bulls and horses; evi-
dence against flies as important vector.
1974 Falls County, TX 0 > 236  Epi-Aid 1975-6, (18,19) B. anthracis– positive sample from city water tap, so city
water supply was hyperchlorinated. Soil samples collected to
document efficacy of carcass incineration were negative.
1971 Danville, PA 0 33  Epi-Aid 1972-19 B. anthracis isolated from both hay and soil samples.
1971 Gonzales, LA 2 588  Epi-Aid 1971-131, (3,20,21) One culture positive and one negative in exposed veterinari-
ans. Low attack rate in calves reduced likelihood that biting
flies were an important vector.
1970 Yoder, WY 0 8  Epi-Aid 1971-44, (22) Veterinarian placed on antibiotic prophylaxis as a result of
laceration while performing necropsy.
1968 Inyo County, CA 1  176  Epi-Aid 1969-20, (23) Extensive discussion and literature review of Tabanid spe-
cies (horsefly) as potential vector; role in transmission
remains inconclusive.
1968 Hampton, CT 0 3 Epi-Aid 1968-78 204  kg  of  B. anthracis–contaminated meat sold as ham-
burger before investigation. No human cases of anthrax
known to have occurred as a result.
1965 Grand Forks, ND 0 19  Epi-Aid 1966-12, (24) 30 diabetic children swam 3 miles downstream from where
an animal was found dead from anthrax; riverborne spread
determined minimal; prophylaxis considered unnecessary.
1962 MS 0 Multiple Epi-Aid 1963-2 Involved many counties.
1959 Brownsville, Cam-
eron County, TX
5 125 Epi-Aid  1960-12 Two cases laboratory confirmed. Cases occurred in three
veterinarians and two other patients who had intimate con-
tact during necropsy, handling, or skinning.
1959 NJ (south) 1 2 cows, many hogs Epi-Aid 1959-38 Not  laboratory confirmed. Several hogs developed illness
after feeding on entrails of sick cows.
1958 LA (north) 0 15–20  Epi-Aid 1958-42 Involved cows, sheep, and horses.
1957 Vinita, OK 1 400–500  Epi-Aid 1958-11, (25) Large epizootic on farms curtailed after intensive immuniza-
tion campaign.
1956 Saratoga, WY 0 Multiple Epi-Aid 1957-17 Animal anthrax in mountainous area led to concern over
water supply downstream.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1167
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Table 2 continued. Characteristics of CDC field investigations of anthrax in humans and animals, 1950–August 2001a
Year Location
No. of cases
Reference Comments Human Animal
1956 MS (northwest) 0 >250 Epi-Aid 1957-3 No  evidence to support insectborne transmission, despite
local beliefs. Involved 224 head of cattle, 42 mules, 5 horses,
3 sheep, 2 goats, multiple hogs. One case of suspected
anthrax in a child was investigated and determined to be
mumps.
1955 LA (southeast) 0 1,404 Epi-Aid 1955-5 Large epizootic in cattle. Unconfirmed reports of four
human cases. B. anthracis isolated from flies in two
instances at State Animal Disease Laboratory. 
1952 OH (five counties) 0 Multiple  Epi-Aid 1952-13, (26) B. anthracis isolated from swine feed; contaminated bone-
meal suspected as source of infections.
Textile mills (n=13 investigations)
1987 Charlotte, NC 1 0 Epi-Aid 1987-77, (27) Suspected cross-contamination of Australian wool from stor-
age space shared with contaminated West Asian cashmere.
1978 NH (southeast) 2 0 Epi-Aid 1978-65 Patients did not wear protective equipment. One had sys-
temic signs and symptoms (fever, headache, sore neck, mal-
aise, anorexia) after his initial lesion was lanced. Subsequent
full recovery.
1978 Shelby, NC 2 0 Epi-Aid 1978-47 Contents of vacuum cleaner bags or floor sweepings from
four employee homes were collected; 1 tested positive for B.
anthracis. 300 soil samples tested from mill premises, land-
fill site, and nearby residences. In mill, more positive sam-
ples in rooms where earliest processing occurred.
1974 Belton, SC 1 0 Epi-Aid 1974-77 Report suggested prevention should be based on minimizing
contact between employees and contaminated material, and
on routine vaccination of employees at risk. Patient not ade-
quately vaccinated.
1972 Manchester, NH N/A N/A Epi-Aid 1972-94 Effectiveness of formaldehyde vapor decontamination of B.
anthracis spores assessed using spore strips in treated and
untreated (control) areas of mill complex, and comparing
pre- and posttreatment surface samples. No positives among
599 posttreatment specimens.
1967 Dillon, SC N/A N/A (28) A building contaminated with B. anthracis was successfully
decontaminated with formaldehyde vapor. 100,000 spores on
24 plates pretreatment were reduced to 21 sterile plates, and
3 plates with 2 colonies each, posttreatment. 26 of 142 sur-
face swabs tested positive before decontamination, and 1 of
200 swabs tested positive 6 months after decontamination.
Building was deemed safe for occupancy and no further
cases were reported.
1966 Manchester, NH 2 0 Epi-Aid 1967-43 Patient with inhalational anthrax had history of "smoker's
cough," diabetes, alcoholism, and chronic pancreatitis.
Exposure believed to have occurred while patient worked for
4–5 hours directly opposite a goat hair–processing mill.
1961 Philadelphia, PA 1 0 Epi-Aid 1961-40; (29) After case reported, supplies of new and improved Wright
vaccine sent to mill for use among employees.
1960 SC 4 0 Epi-Aid 1960-31, (30) All four cases responded well to antibiotic treatment.
1957 Philadelphia, PA 1 0 (31,32) Two additional inhalational cases mentioned that occurred
over an 8-year period in persons living near the same con-
taminated tannery.
1957 Manchester, NH 9 0 Epi-Aid 1958-18, (33–36) Employees noted increased dust in air after initiating a new
scouring technique in textile mill.
1956 Monroe, NC >5 0 Epi-Aid 1956-29, (37) Studies indicated heavy environmental contamination of mill
with B. anthracis spores. 
1953 Monroe, NC 1 0 Epi-Aid 1953-14 Nasal swabs of employees performed to assess exposure. No
results available.
Other settings (n=7 investigations)
1998 CA, IN, KY, TN 0 0 Epi-Aid 1999-25, (38)  Evaluation of multiple telephone threats and letters alleged
to contain B. anthracis. Report included recommendations
for response to bioterrorism threats.ANTHRAX PERSPECTIVES
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In agricultural settings, investigators frequently tested
samples of soil, water, and animal carcasses. Environmental
sampling was specifically mentioned in 13 agricultural investi-
gations. Elaborate systematic sampling strategies for soil were
sometimes used, such as in Louisiana in 1971 (Epi-Aid 1971-
131) and in Texas in 1974 (Epi-Aid 1975-6). In other investi-
gations, objects that tested positive for B. anthracis in farm
settings included hay in Pennsylvania in 1971 (Epi-Aid 1972-
19), biting flies in Louisiana in 1955 (Epi-Aid 1955-5), and
swine feed made from B. anthracis–contaminated bonemeal in
Ohio in 1952 (Epi-Aid 1952-13).
During a series of anthrax threats and hoaxes in 1998 (38)
(Epi-Aid 1999-25), samples from mailed letters were tested for
B. anthracis spores by phase microscopy in a university
microbiology laboratory, cultured for B. anthracis in Labora-
tory Response Network Level B laboratories (56), and sub-
jected to rapid antigen testing by the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. All samples from
letters were negative. Environmental samples taken from
buildings after telephoned threats of contaminated air-han-
dling systems were also negative. In other investigations,
objects tested for B. anthracis were goat hair pipe insulation
(52), imported yarn (12), a knitted sweater (Epi-Aid 1967-43-
3), goat hair from contaminated horse saddle pads (44), and
Haitian goatskin handicrafts at various stages of the manufac-
turing process (46,47) (Epi-Aid 1974-96).
With regard to clinical testing in human cases, most
detailed reports mention smears and cultures being done on
skin lesions and blood samples. Some of these tests were con-
ducted after antibiotics had been started, thereby reducing the
likelihood of a positive result. Several of the more recent
investigations included serologic tests for antibodies to B.
anthracis antigens but did not assess the utility of these clini-
cal assays. Nasal swabs were collected from 37 workers dur-
ing a 1953 North Carolina textile mill anthrax investigation
(Epi-Aid 1953-14); laboratory results are not available. No
Table 2 continued. Characteristics of CDC field investigations of anthrax in humans and animals, 1950–August 2001a
Year Location
No. of cases
Reference Comments Human Animal
1976 Morro Bay, CA 1 0 (12,39,40) Suspected source of anthrax in home craftsman was contam-
inated yarn imported from Pakistan. Multiple samples of
yarn tested positive for B. anthracis. Subsequent CPSC
warning on imported yarn. 
1975 Camden,  NJ 3 0 (41–43) Cutaneous anthrax in three gelatin manufacturing plant
workers from contact with contaminated dry cattle bones;
FDA recall of dicalcium phosphate animal feed product.
1974 Sequim, WA 0 42  (44,45) Several cougars and other large felines on private game farm
died after feeding on infected horsemeat. Primary source:
horse's saddle pad contained B. anthracis–contaminated goat
hair from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Subsequent CPSC
warning on contaminated saddle pads.
1974 Haiti; FL 1 in US; 
194 in Haiti 
(1963-1974)
0 Epi-Aid 1974-96, (7,46–50) One human case in U.S.; 194 cases identified in Haiti in
1963–1974. 72 (25%) of 287 Haitian goatskin handicrafts
tested from January to May 1974 were culture positive for B.
anthracis, including voodoo balancing dolls, rugs, whole
skins, mosaic pictures, purses, and drums. Subsequent CPSC
warning on contaminated Haitian goatskin products.
1966 Manchester, NH 1 0 Epi-Aid 1967-43-3 Source of cutaneous infection in housewife unknown, but
knitting yarn could not be ruled out. Three samples from
knitted sweater positive for B. anthracis; samples from other
sources negative.
1964 Oxford, OH 1 0 (51,52) Fatal cutaneous anthrax in installer of pipe insulation made
with imported goat hair. Insulation and goat hair samples
tested positive for B. anthracis.
Suspected anthrax shown due to other causes (n=5 investigations)
1975 Yavapai County, 
AZ
1 0 Epi-Aid 1975-115 23-year-old male machinist initially thought to have anthrax
but quickly determined to have plague.
1969 Casper, WY 1  0 Epi-Aid 1969-78 Meat packing company employee; anthrax thought not to be
responsible.
1967 Nepal 26 Multiple Epi-Aid 1968-34 Community outbreak of cutaneous disease; subsequently
diagnosed as plague.
1965 Charleston,  SC 1  0 Epi-Aid  1966-18,  (53) Cutaneous disease in customs inspector; B. anthracis not
implicated.
1957 Jamestown, NY 5  0 Epi-Aid 1958-16 Cutaneous disease in butchers; later believed to be a strepto-
coccal or staphylococcal infection.
aCDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CPSC, Consumer Product Safety Commission; OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration; FDA, U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration; USDA, U.S. Department of Agriculture; NIOSH, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1169
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other investigations mentioned use of nasal swabs, and the
effectiveness of nasal swabs in detecting B. anthracis infection
was not discussed in the reports reviewed. 
Decontamination
Several reports recommended specific measures for decon-
taminating affected areas or materials. A 1953 report sug-
gested that all dirt, dust, and sweepings from a potentially
contaminated textile mill be burned (Epi-Aid 1953-14). A
1960 report indicated that a livestock rendering plant was
“cleaned up in the recommended manner with 5% hot lye solu-
tion” (Epi-Aid 1960-12). A 1967 report recommended installa-
tion of a high-temperature furnace at the textile mill for
burning wastes (Epi-Aid 1967-43). A 1978 report recom-
mended that potentially contaminated textile mill wastes be
soaked in a 5% formaldehyde solution before burial in a land-
fill (Epi-Aid 1978-65).
The report on Epi-Aid 1972-94 contains the most detail on
building-decontamination procedures. In this investigation, an
unoccupied New Hampshire textile mill complex slated for
demolition was decontaminated. Recommendations were
based in part on experience in the earlier decontamination of
two South Carolina mill buildings (28); those buildings were
subsequently used by another industry for >2 years without
any cases of human anthrax being reported. The New Hamp-
shire mill buildings were decontaminated with 9,691 L of liq-
uid formaldehyde that was vaporized and delivered into the
interior rooms of the sealed buildings. None of 260 spore
strips containing B. anthracis, B. globigii (now known as B.
atrophaeus), or B. subtilis placed in treated areas of the mill
complex showed growth; 23 of 40 such strips placed in
untreated (control) areas showed spore growth. In addition, 2
of 555 surface swabs tested positive before treatment, but none
of 599 swabs tested positive after treatment. These data from
spore strips and surface swabs suggest that the decontamina-
tion process was effective in reducing and possibly eliminating
the environmental contamination with B. anthracis.
During a 1974 anthrax epizootic in Texas (Epi-Aid 1975-
6), investigators evaluated the disposal of infected animal car-
casses by burning them with old tires, wood, and crank case
oil. All 21 samples of carcass ashes, underlying soil, and soil
up to 1 m from the burn site were negative for B. anthracis.
Cross-Contamination
Two reports mentioned evidence of cross-contamination
from a primary contaminated object to another object or site.
In a North Carolina textile mill in 1987 (Epi-Aid 1987-77),
investigators speculated that the sample of B. anthracis–con-
taminated Australian wool had been cross-contaminated by B.
anthracis–contaminated West Asian cashmere stored in the
same room. During another North Carolina anthrax outbreak
in 1978 (Epi-Aid 1978-47), one of four vacuum cleaner dust
samples from the homes of textile mill workers was positive
for  B. anthracis, suggesting that workers carried spores on
their clothes from the mills to their homes. No cases of anthrax
in workers’ families were reported, suggesting that exposures
to B. anthracis in the home were not clinically significant.
Misidentification of Cutaneous Anthrax
A complete differential diagnosis of the clinical manifesta-
tions of anthrax includes many other diseases (57,58). In five
investigation reports and one MMWR case report, cutaneous
lesions initially diagnosed as possible anthrax were subse-
quently attributed to other diseases (Table 2). In 1975, anthrax
was initially suspected in a 23-year-old Arizona man, but his
illness was quickly determined to be plague (Epi-Aid 1975-
115). In 1973, two sisters in California developed vesiculopap-
ular lesions on their fingers after contact with ill lambs.
Anthrax was suspected, but the cultures were negative, and the
disease was diagnosed as human orf (59). In 1969, investiga-
tors determined that a gram-positive spore-forming bacillus
from a skin lesion on a Wyoming meat-packing company
worker was not B. anthracis, but no definitive species identifi-
cation could be made (Epi-Aid 1969-78). B. anthracis was ini-
tially suspected as the cause of cutaneous lesions in persons in
a remote village in Nepal in 1967, but plague was subse-
quently documented (Epi-Aid 1968-34). In 1965, laboratory
samples from a skin lesion of a South Carolina customs
inspector who had had contact with imported wool were nega-
tive for B. anthracis. Although no definitive diagnosis was
made, the clinical picture made anthrax unlikely (Epi-Aid
1966-18). Finally, in 1957, cutaneous lesions on five New
York butchers initially considered as possible anthrax were
subsequently diagnosed as pyoderma caused by staphylococci,
streptococci, or both (Epi-Aid 1958-16).
Recommendations and Impact of Investigations
Field investigation reports usually contain public health
recommendations; many of these are appropriate for future
anthrax epidemics or exposures. For infections associated with
textile mills, a 1974 report stated that “decontamination of the
primary source of B. anthracis is not generally held to be prac-
tical” (Epi-Aid 1974-77). The reports on textile mill investiga-
tions recommended anthrax vaccine with annually scheduled
booster inoculations for mill workers at risk; use of personal
protective equipment including specific work clothing and res-
pirators, shower facilities, and separate lockers for work and
street clothing; physical separation of raw and finished materi-
als to prevent cross-contamination; design of work areas for
easy cleaning; and air-exhaust systems designed to prevent the
spread of spores. One report recommended that mill employ-
ees be “thoroughly indoctrinated” on the cause, nature, and
control of anthrax (Epi-Aid 1953-14). In 1999, following mul-
tiple bioterrorist threats (38) (Epi-Aid 1999-25), antibiotic pro-
phylaxis was recommended in cases with known or credible
risk for direct exposure. For persons with suspected exposure
to aerosolized spores, recommendations included isolating
exposed clothing in a plastic bag, showering with copious
amounts of soap and water, and washing all possibly contami-
nated materials with a 1:10 bleach dilution (38).ANTHRAX PERSPECTIVES
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Table 3. Inhalational and cutaneous anthrax in humans in CDC field investigations, United States, 1950–2001a
Year Location Occupation Source Age, sex Referenceb Comments
Inhalational (n=9 cases)
1976 Morro Bay, CA Self-employed weaver Imported yarn 32, M  (12) Fatal inhalational anthrax due to contam-
inated imported yarn containing goat
hair.
1966 Manchester, NH Metal shop employee Nearby mill 
processing goat hair
46, M Epi-Aid 
1967-43
Dust from neighboring goat hair mill
identified as source. Incidence of anthrax
at plant decreased with mandatory vacci-
nation. Patient's coexisting illnesses may
have contributed to susceptibility.
1961 Philadelphia, PA  Secretary in textile mill Goat hair 50, F Epi-Aid 
1961-40
Fatal inhalational anthrax. Unusual
because little contact with goat hair in
routine work duties.
1957 Manchester, NH Gillboxer in textile mill Goat hair 60, M Epi-Aid 
1958-18
Five inhalational cases of anthrax (four
fatal) occurred in the 600 employees of a
textile mill. Four cutaneous cases
occurred during the same outbreak.
Bobbin cleaner and 
weaver
65, F
Card fixer 49, M
Card tender 61, M  
(recovered)
Noil remover  33, M
1957 Philadelphia, PA  Factory employee Nearby mill processing 
goat hair
29,  M (31,32) Fatal inhalational anthrax in man with
sarcoidosis. Possible exposures from
glue made from animal hides, or goatskin
tannery with sweepings and surfaces test-
ing positive for Bacillus anthracis, which
patient walked by daily.
Cutaneousc (n=39 cases)
2001 TX (southwest) Farm worker Infected animal ?, M Epi-Aid 
2001-61
Exposure during disposal of 
infected carcasses.
2000 ND (east) Farm worker Infected animal 67, M Epi-Aid 
2000-69 
Exposure during disposal of 
infected carcasses.
1987 Charlotte, NC Maintenance employee  West Asian cashmere 42, M Epi-Aid 
1987-77
Worked in a goat hair–processing mill.
1978 NH (southeast) Worker at goat hair– 
processing mill
Goat hair 20, M Epi-Aid 
1978-65
Loaded hair-carding machine and 
performed other tasks.
19,  M Worked at hair mixing and carding
machines during week before onset of
symptoms.
1978 Shelby, NC Maintenance worker at 
goat hair–processing 
mill
Goat hair 59, M Epi-Aid 
1978-47
Temporary worker at 
goat hair–processing 
mill
Goat hair 67, M
1974 Belton, SC Employee at textile mill Goat hair 38, F Epi-Aid 
1974-77
Worked in mill spinning area.
1974 Haiti; FL Navy journalist-
photographer
Goatskin in Haitian 
handicrafts
22, F Epi-Aid 
1974-96
Cutaneous anthrax in FL resident after
purchase of B. anthracis–contaminated
goatskin drums in Haiti.
1971 Gonzales, LA Two veterinarians Infected cow 52, M; 26, M Epi-Aid 
1971-131
Disease contracted during necropsy.
1968 Inyo County, CA Farmhand Unknown 63, M Epi-Aid 
1969-20
Suspected human cutaneous case, in
region of horsefly bite; patient responsi-
ble for burning cattle carcasses. Cattle
and horsefly exposures considered.
1966 Manchester, NH Truck driver Goat hair 35, M Epi-Aid 
1967-43
Truck driver helped unload delivered
bales despite being instructed not to help.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1171
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For infections associated with farms and livestock, reports
recommended vaccination of animals at risk, better education
of farm workers on anthrax diagnosis and control, thorough
destruction by burning of infected animals, prevention of
infected livestock from reaching the market, improved supervi-
sion of slaughter and meat inspection, and, in some situations,
farm quarantine. After the 1974 Texas epizootic (Epi-Aid
1975-06), anthrax vaccine was tested in dairy cattle to assure
that the vaccine had no adverse effect on milk safety (6).
Investigations of B. anthracis–contaminated saddle pads
(1974), Haitian handicrafts (1974), and imported yarn (1976)
led to Consumer Product Safety Commission recommenda-
tions for destroying those products (7,39,45). In 1975, cutane-
ous anthrax developed in a New Jersey gelatin manufacturing
plant worker after his exposure to contaminated dry cattle
bones; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration lev-
ied fines for workplace safety violations (41).
The Haitian investigation also led to a federal ban on
importing Haitian goatskin products. A review of such handi-
crafts collected at U.S. quarantine stations in 1980–1981 found
that items continued to be contaminated with B. anthracis (47).
Recommendations to the Haitian Ministry of Health included
providing incentives for reporting diseased animals, improving
laboratory diagnostic capacity, increasing anthrax vaccination
levels among livestock, educating livestock owners about the
benefits of anthrax control, and improving the tanning proce-
dures for goatskin drum heads (Epi-Aid 1974-96).
Discussion
In this report we review what has been learned from >40
epidemiologic field investigations of confirmed or suspected
anthrax outbreaks in humans or animals during the last 50
years. In the 2001 bioterrorism response, investigators evalu-
ated suspected anthrax cases by using clinical and laboratory
diagnostic methods, such as chest radiographs, cultures, and
serologic assays, that had been developed and refined during
earlier investigations of inhalational and cutaneous anthrax in
textile mill workers. In addition, histopathologic and immuno-
histochemical testing proved essential for diagnosing anthrax
in persons who had been placed on antibiotics early and whose
cultures were thus negative. Nasal swabs, as used in the 1953
textile mill investigation, are currently considered an unevalu-
Table 3 continued. Inhalational and cutaneous anthrax in humans in CDC field investigations, United States, 1950–2001a
Year Location Occupation Source Age, sex Referenceb Comments
1966 Manchester, NH Unknown Not determined 35, F Epi-Aid 
1967-43-3
Source uncertain; three samples from




Camden, NJ Three gelatin manufac-
turing plant workers
Contaminated dry cow 





(41–43) OSHA fined gelatin factory owners for
failure to protect workers.
1964 Oxford, OH Pipe insulation installer Goat hair in pipe 
insulation
36, M (51) Fatal cutaneous case featured in a 1965
New Yorker article by Berton Roueche
(52).
1960 SC Four textile mill 
employees












One veterinarian had performed
necropsy on a steer; other exposures not
specified.
Employee at rendering 
plant
Not specified ?, M
Unspecified Infected steer "adolescent 
boy"
Suspected exposure while skinning steer
in Mexico.
1959 NJ (south) Farmer Undetermined 23, M Epi-Aid 
1959-38
Possible sources included cows that died
of anthrax, and fertilizer with contami-
nated goat hair.
1957 Vinita, OK Veterinarian Infected cow ?, M Epi-Aid 
1958-11
Had performed necropsy on a cow.
1957 Manchester, NH Two weavers and two 
card tenders at textile 
mill






1956 Monroe, NC Five textile mill 
employees
Goat hair ? Epi-Aid 
1956-29
1953 Monroe, NC Textile mill employee Goat hair 36, F Epi-Aid 
1953-14
aCDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
bSee Table 2 for additional references.
cExcludes investigations in Paraguay and Kazakhstan, where the number of human cases is uncertain.ANTHRAX PERSPECTIVES
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ated adjunct to environmental sampling for defining exposed
populations in bioterrorism investigations (1,60). Nasal swabs
were used in the 2001 investigation for defining the aerosol
spread of B. anthracis spores in the Hart Senate Office Build-
ing and some other settings.
In the 2001 bioterrorism investigation, an anti-protective
antigen, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (61) was used to
confirm B. anthracis infection in several cases. Development
of this assay was the culmination of decades of laboratory
experience and research associated with past field investiga-
tions of anthrax.
Asymptomatic infection was documented in one serologic
survey (33) conducted several months after an inhalational
anthrax outbreak; however, in past and current investigations,
the role of asymptomatic infection in providing protection is
unclear. Human-to-human spread was not evident in any of the
investigations reviewed.
Investigation into a series of anthrax-related threats and
hoaxes in 1998 (Epi-Aid 1999-25) also helped lay the ground-
work for the recent response. In that investigation, guidelines
for risk assessment and postexposure antibiotic prophylaxis
were developed, and coordination with first responders and
law enforcement was emphasized (38). The investigation also
led to revised immunization recommendations (5), which dis-
cuss the use of vaccine for postexposure prophylaxis.
In response to the bioterrorism events of 2001, additional
guidelines were published on investigating and responding to
B. anthracis exposures. These address clinical testing, use of
antibiotic prophylaxis, closing of potentially contaminated
buildings, and postexposure treatment options (1,62,63). Cur-
rent recommendations for the use of anthrax vaccine are based
in large part on a field trial conducted in 1962 (2,5). During the
2001 response, vaccination recommendations were expanded
to at-risk populations; the 1962 vaccine efficacy study forms
part of the justification for considering the vaccine for postex-
posure prophylaxis. Currently, the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices recommends that vaccine be used in
combination with antibiotics (ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, or
penicillin) following a B. anthracis bioterrorism exposure, if
vaccine is available (5). Vaccination is a critical component of
the nation’s preparedness and response activities for B. anthra-
cis bioterrorism.
In past field investigations, the primary risk factor for
human cutaneous anthrax has been direct physical contact with
infected animals or commercial products containing B. anthra-
cis spores. Ranchers, butchers, and veterinarians were at risk
for such contact when working with infected animals. All the
commercial products causing human infection were of animal
origin; most were made from imported goat skin or hair.
For inhalational anthrax, the main risk factor was exposure
to aerosolized spores, especially in or near a textile mill that
processes goat hair. While it is unclear why some workers
become infected while others in the same dusty environment
do not, several factors may increase the likelihood for infec-
tion. First, direct work with unprocessed goat hair may create a
heavier exposure to B. anthracis spores. Second, a weakened
immune system may increase a person’s susceptibility to
infection (64). Two of the patients with inhalational anthrax
probably had chronic pulmonary disease. In the 1957 investi-
gation, sarcoidosis was present (31). In the 1966 investigation
of a metal shop worker (Epi-Aid 1967-43), investigators noted
the worker’s “chronic cigarette cough” and suggested that his
alcoholism, diabetes, and pancreatitis might have made him
more susceptible than his healthy coworkers.
Over the past 50 years, a series of recommendations have
focused mainly on preventing occupationally acquired
anthrax, especially in textile mills and agricultural settings.
For example, in 1962, anthrax vaccine was recommended for
persons who handle imported hair, wool, hides, or bonemeal
(2). More recently, it was recommended that veterinarians
obtain diagnostic specimens but not perform necropsies on
animals suspected to have died from anthrax (36). The
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has been
actively involved in many recent anthrax-related investiga-
tions (15,65).
Some documents mentioned insects as possible vectors in
the spread of B. anthracis. While mechanical spread of B.
anthracis organisms by stable flies has been demonstrated in
guinea pigs (66), the importance of insects as vectors in epi-
zootics has not been determined. One hypothesis suggests that
insect bites might allow superficial organisms an effective
access point for intradermal infection. Insects, particularly
horseflies, were explicitly mentioned in 12 investigations for
their possible role in transmission; however, no evidence
exists that biting flies contribute to transmission of disease
from animals to humans.
Past methods for decontaminating buildings relied upon
formaldehyde gas, now known to be carcinogenic. The recent
decontamination of B. anthracis–contaminated buildings was
accomplished with chlorine dioxide gas, by using the methods
developed for decontaminating textile mill buildings. Pre- and
posttreatment environmental sampling strategies developed in
several of the earlier field investigations, including the system-
atic use of surface swabs and spore strips, were also used in
the response to recent events. In these events, the wide disper-
sion from envelopes of small airborne particles containing
spores led to higher than expected levels of cross-contamina-
tion, making decontamination more difficult (65).
Several limitations should be considered in interpreting the
results of this review. CDC conducts field investigations only
when invited by a state health department or ministry of
health. Anthrax cases that did not actively involve CDC staff,
such as those investigated solely by state or local health
departments, were excluded; therefore, this is not a complete
report of U.S. anthrax case investigations. However, CDC staff
have consulted at least by telephone on almost every case of
human anthrax reported in the United States since the 1950s
(A. Kaufmann, pers. comm.). A manuscript reviewing the
characteristics of all anthrax cases reported in the United
States since 1955 is in preparation (D. Ashford, pers. comm.).Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1173
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Second, this review examines CDC’s experience with field
investigations involving anthrax; laboratory-based anthrax
research was not included unless it was related to a field inves-
tigation. Third, final laboratory results were not available for
some field investigations.
Conclusion
Much useful knowledge, ranging from the diagnosis of
anthrax to the use of vaccine to protect populations, has been
gained from these past investigations. However, many ques-
tions remain. Further research is needed to determine the low-
est infectious dose, define what constitutes a true exposure for
which antibiotic prophylaxis is warranted (especially in light
of possible drug side effects), and determine whether spores
delivered in an envelope create a residual risk after the primary
contamination event. Other areas in which more research is
needed include developing better rapid environmental testing
methods (67), identifying optimal decontamination methods
for a variety of contaminated settings, assessing B. anthracis
spore background rates in selected settings, and determining
the level of risk associated with a low degree of exposure to
aerosols containing B. anthracis.
During the past 50 years, the scientific knowledge
acquired in these field investigations has greatly improved the
nation’s ability to respond to anthrax outbreaks. New and
unique challenges have been raised by the recent intentional
release of B. anthracis. Further efforts to improve knowledge
about anthrax, both in its natural setting and in the context of
bioterrorism, are urgently needed.
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